

Yes — I've analysed this first batch and created a separate **Part 2 working report** that is structured so we can keep adding the other files as you upload them.

The strongest findings so far are the repeated CEMS/data-loss incidents during February–March 2026, including forced Windows updates taking CDAS communications

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Emissions, Monitoring and Incident Review – Part 2

Working draft: additional 2026 Schedule 5 notifications and monitoring incidents

Evidence currently reviewed: January–June 2026 documents supplied in this batch

Prepared from documents supplied in this conversation

Date: 26 August 2026

Important note

This Part 2 report is intended to be extended as further files are supplied. It is an analytical review of the records provided and is not legal advice. It distinguishes actual emission-limit notifications from monitoring-data-loss events and does not treat a missing half-hour as proof that an exceedance occurred during the missing period.

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Appendix A. Part 2 incident register

Appendix B. Source documents reviewed

1. Executive summary

The additional 2026 records show two parallel compliance themes: continuing combustion-related CO excursions, and a concentrated series of failures or errors affecting the continuous emissions monitoring system (CEMS). They also add an anaerobic-digestion biogas release and a significant particulate-matter event associated with a detached baghouse filter bag.

- 22 January 2026: Line 2 CO reached 116.20 mg/Nm³ against a 100 mg/Nm³ limit. A later Part B attributes the spike to a sudden increase in high-CV waste, rapid O₂ reduction and increased steam flow; the burners did not respond quickly enough within the half-hour.
- February–March 2026: repeated monitoring interruptions affected both EfW lines. Causes include uncontrolled/forced Windows updates on CDAS computers, incorrect nitrogen-bottle pressure, operator error during QAL3 work, and analyser mode/control problems.
- The 7 February and 11 March CDAS incidents were retrospectively linked to the same root cause: inadequate control of system updates, causing simultaneous forced updates and loss of CDAS–DCS communications.
- The 3 and 4 March CEMS events were also retrospectively linked to one cause: incorrect nitrogen-bottle pressure after replacement. The recurrence on consecutive days indicates the fault was not immediately identified or permanently controlled after the first event.